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A widely noted empirical regularity of congressional behavior is that standing commit­
tees exert disproportionate influence on congressional choices. The observed phenomenon 
has a number of labels-committee influence, committee power, and (from the parent cham­
ber's perspective) deference to committees-and a large body of theoretical and empirical 
research has sought to determine when and why it exists. This paper takes as given only 
the weakest form the observation, namely, that committee power exists sometimes. It does 
not directly address the questions of when and why committee power exists, although much 
of the relevant literature is reviewed. Rather, it focuses on a prerequisite to the resolution 
of disputes about committee power. How can committee power be assessed empirically? 
Section I reviews three classes of explanations and identifies obstacles to convincing em­
pirical tests of the accounts. Section II introduces an econometric approach for analyzing 
committee power. Section III applies the technique to a sequence of votes on minimum wage 
legislation in the Senate in 1977. Section IV extends the technique to multi-dimensional 
choice spaces. Section V is a discussion and summary. 
I. Explanations and Problems of Inference 
The quantity of literature on committee power is a testimony to its central place in 
the study of legislatures. Our objective is not to review the literature exhaustively1 but 
rather to classify explanations for committee power and to highlight a common obstacle 
to evaluating these explanations empirically. The three classes are behavioral, institutional 
and informational. 
Behavioral explanations for committee power are grounded in sociological literature and 
focus on a system of norms or informal rules of the game such as reciprocity and deference 
(Matthews, 1960). The parent chamber is said to defer to committees because the parent 
1 Interested readers should see Eulau and McCluggage (1984). 
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chamber consists of members who are on other committees and who presumably will bene­
fit in-kind from future acts of defereme. These reciprocity arrangements may take several 
forms. At the individual level, members simply trade votes (Tullock, 1970). At the com­
mittee level, cross-jurisdictional logrolling may occur (Ferejohn, 1985). Members self-select 
onto committees whose jurisdictions contain policies that are of special interest to their 
constituents (Shepsle, 1978). Committees' proposals are then typically well-received on the 
floor with the implicit understanding that today's recipients of deference (the committee 
members) will at some future date act reciprocally as grantors of deference (as members of 
the parent chamber) to other committees' legislation. Many congressional policies are char­
acterized as conferring concentrated benefits to constituents while dispersing costs (Wilson, 
1973, pp. 333-4), and this feature, combined with the ability of congressmen similarly to 
claim credit and disperse blame helps sustain logrolling agreements. Indeed, the committee 
system itself may also facilitate credible credit-claiming by giving members opportunities to 
engage in oversight activities that are likely to be observed by constituents (Mayhew, 1974,
p. 92). Whatever the basis for deferential behavior, reciprocity, and logrolling,2 their end 
result is the same: adoption of policies that disproportionately reflect committee members' 
preferences vis-a-vis those of the parent chamber. Thus, norms or informal rules of the 
game may enhance committee power. 
A contrasting but not necessarily incompatible explanation for committee power is 
institutional and focuses on how formal rules and precedents confer disproportionate ben­
efits to committees. The more recent of this literature employs formal models to illustrate 
or to specify general conditions under which committees acquire favored outcomes. For 
example, committees may benefit as initial proposers of legislation if they can initiate or 
obstruct legislation (Romer and Rosenthal, 1978; Denzau and Mackay, 1983; and Kreh­
biel, 1985).3 Broad jurisdictions and complex special orders may create opportunities for 
strategic "bundling" of legislation and corresponding disproportionate benefits (Gilligan 
2 Under specifiable formal assumptions the political benefits from reciprocity arrange­
ments may exceed their political costs. Thus, the traditional sociological focus on norms 
as keys to understanding congressional behavior is not necessarily inconsistent with more 
recent, eqmomically-oriented studies. Hence, for example, the "rational choice perspective 
for congressional norms"(Weingast, 1979; See also Fiorina, 1981).
3 Note however that procedures such as the discharge petition in the House and dis­
charge pr�cedents i� the Senate cast doubt on the descriptive accuracy of these powers with 
respect to Congress. 
2 
and I\rehbiel, 1986 ). And committees may possess power as negotiators (or, perhaps more 
accuratel.r, as bicameral co-conspiritors) in conf0 ·euce committees if they possess an "ex 
post veto" (Shepsle and Weingast, 1987). 
Finally, committee power may be attributable to the informational advantage that 
committee members possess for policies within their jurisdictions. With few exceptions, 
comparative and case studies of congressional committees stress the role of committees 
as repositories of policy expertise (MacNeil, 1963; Fenno, 1973). Several accounts also 
stress the incentives for individual committee members to acquire expertise (Matthews, 
1960; Huitt and Peabody, 1969; Fenno, 1966) and the disproportionate committee power 
that can arise (MacNeil, 1963; Manley, 1970; Fenno 1973). Indeed, historical studies of 
Congress argue persuasively that one key rationale for the standing committee system was 
for committees to specialize in the acquisition of information to serve the parent chamber 
(Cooper, 1970).4
How can the behavioral, institutional and informational accounts of committee power 
be assessed, compared, or refuted? In light of the difficulty of these tasks, the diversity of 
existing empirical efforts to assess committee power is not surprising.5 Nor is the persistence 
of controversies over the sources of committee power. Obviously, empirical assessment of 
committee power is severely constrained by what is observable. Less obvious, however, are 
several pervasive problems of inference that confuse the meanings of that which is readily 
observable. Consider two sets of examples, corresponding to the behavioral and institutional 
explanations, respectively. 
First, observation of hostile or deferential behavior in the form of amendment activity 
may offer insights regarding committee power. For example, small or large numbers of 
4 Of course, the informational advantage may be a mixed blessing for the parent chamber 
insofar as expertise also gives rise to the possibility of strategic use of private information 
by the committee. The prospects for strategic use of information are widely accepted 
in economics, but the associated theory is just beginning to be used to study legislative 
politics. See, for example, Austen-Smith and Riker (1987) for a voting game with private 
information, and Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) for a committee-parent chamber game with 
asymmetric information and endogenous choice of procedures. 
5 These include case studies and comparative studies using interview techniques (e.g., 
Fenno, 1966, 1973), studies based on analysis of congressional data (e.g., Bach, 1985; Dyson 
and Soule, 1970; Smith, 1986), one study based on analysis of stock market data (Gilligan 
and Krehbiel, 1986) and several books containing a variety of techniques (e.g., Fenno, 1966; 
Smith and Deering, 1984). 
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amendments offered to a committee's bills may indicate deference toward the committee 
or power of the committee, respectively. In the extreme, cor, ,nittee power may manifest 
itself in the form of refusal on the part of parent chamber to amend the committee's bills. 
Yet, as the following possibilities illustrate, inferences from such data regarding committee 
power are hazardous. First, committee and parent chamber preferences may not diverge, 
in which case the issue of committee power vis-a-vis the parent chamber is moot. Second, 
preferences may diverge but committees may be weak. Nevertheless, if committee members 
anticipate being "rolled" on the floor, they may report face-saving bills that correspond 
more closely to parent chamber preferences than to thos� of the committee. Conversely, a 
strong committee might be more willing to confront amendments. Dyson and Soule (1970) 
try to avoid this problem by counting only amendments that pass over the opposition of a 
majority of committee members, but this does not escape another problem. Amendments 
may be either major or minor, or either close to or far from the committee median. A 
committee that wins on major provisions may lose on minor ones. Furthermore, were it 
possible, weighting amendments by their importance would not work either, because the 
real question is whether the committee ultimately obtained an outcome closer to its ideal 
position than that of the parent chamber.6 
Second, committee power might be assessed by observing (or not observing) various 
formal procedural challenges to the committee. Use of the discharge procedure in the House, 
for example, might be taken as evidence that the discharged committee is weak. Or, refusal 
ti:> use discharge procedures may be interpreted as evidence that the committee is free to 
exploit the parent chamber by reporting bills closer to committee members' positions. How­
ever, the same objections can be lodged against these inferences as were directed towards 
inferences from amendment behavior on the floor. If a committee anticipates a discharge 
petition, then it may concede points in advance to avoid embarrassment from the procedural 
roll. In these cases, the inference of committee power would be wrong.7 
6 Technically, in a unidimensional setting, the spatial issue concerns median voters in the 
committee and on the parent chamber. For simplicity we adopt the convention of referring 
to committees and the parent chamber as unitary actors but acknowledge the associated 
theoretical difficulties. 
7 Analogous inferences based on the use of other procedures are also inappropriate. Ex­
amples include the acceptance or rejection of restrictive rules (which typically benefit com­
mittees), consent or objection to unanimous consent agreements (the latter of which can 
sometimes kill a bill and therefore can be used as a credible threat), or use versus cir-
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More generall�'. although these two classes of inference differ in terms of what is (or 
is not) observed, the crucial missing link is the same: information on actr,-s' preferences. 
W ithout such information inferences about committee power from readily available data 
are fraught with ambiguity. Our point is not that all such inferences about committee 
power are necessarily wrong, but only that they can be, as in the case of Senate minimum 
wage amendments in 1977 (discussed in Section III). There the committee prevailed when 
two amendments to the bill it reported were easily defeated. Traditional approaches would 
count these votes as evidence of committee power. Yet when the final outcome is compared 
to the preferences of different actors, there is no evidence of committee influence: the 
committee proposal was indistinguishable from the chamber median and much lower than 
what a majority of committee members would have preferred. The next section describes a 
technique for estimating preferences that permits stronger inferences about the nature and 
degree of committee power. 
II. Estimation of Preferences 
If committee power can be assessed only by comparing legislative outcomes with leg­
islative preferences, then statistical methods are required to estimate the preferences of 
legislators. The methods described below are, with appropriate adaptation, applicable to a 
broad range of legislative votes. To keep matters simple, we focus on a single undimensional 
issue which, for the sake of concreteness and subsequent application, we refer to as the min­
imum wage level. The minimum wage example is convenient since minimum wages have an 
obvious and natural metric (dollars) and the location of various bills in the policy space is 
known. In Section IV, however, we show that the technique extends to situations where the 
dimension of choice has no natural metric and the location of bills must be estimated. 
In the case of minimum wage legislation, precise estimation of preferences is possible 
without imposing any severe assumptions. This section describes our assumptions about the 
behavior of legislators and explains how roll call votes can be used to estimate preferences. 
�re assume that a legislator's preferences over minimum wage levels can be represented by 
cumvention of restrictive and pro-committee procedures during the resolution of bicameral 
differences (such as appointment of conferees from the committee with original jurisdic­
tion, refusal to instruct conferees, and consideration of the conference report under a strict 
up-or-do\\'n vote). 
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.a symmetric single-peaked utility function u;(O) where 0 denotes the level of the minimum 
wage and i indexes the legislator (i = 1, . . . ,11). We will also assume that u; attain> a 
unique maximum at some point Xi which will be referred to as the legislator's ideal point 
or bliss point.8 Under these assumptions, Ui can be written in the form: 
(1) 
where </>; is any monotone decreasing function. 
Next, the legislator's ideal point is related to characteristics of his or her constituency. 
Characteristics of the legislator's constituency that might influence the legislator's prefer­
ences over minimum wage levels include the average wage level or the proportion of workers 
belonging to labor unions in the constituency. Characteristics of the legislator, such as his 
or her party affiliation or the ratio of union to corporate contributions in his or her party 
affiliation or the ratio of union to corporate contributions in his or her last campaigns might 
also affect minimum wage preferences. These variables are discussed in greater detail in the 
following section, but for now it suffices to identify a vector Zi of factors thought to influence 
the legislator's most preferred minimum wage level Xi· 
If legislators' preferences, x;, were observable, then the natural procedure would be to 
regress Xi on Zi· Thf. task here, of course, is to determine Xi since we have no direct measure 
of legislators' preference� about minimum wages. Nonetheless, following the regression 
analogy, we posit a linear relationship between a legislator's ideal point and his or her 
characteristics: 
Xi= z:r+ £; (i=l,. . .,n) (2) 
where the error term fi is included to capture the effects of all other factors influencing 
the legislator's preferences. As is standard in the literature, we assume that f is normally 
distributed with mean zero and variance u2 independent of Zi• Some recent results suggest 
that the estimator used is somewhat robust to violations of the normality assumption (Ruud, 
1983).9 
B The assumptions here are somewhat weaker than the quadratic utility assumption used 
by Krehbiel and Rivers, 1985, or Poole and Rosenthal, 1985. 
9 Alternatively, the normality assumption can be dropped altogether and semiparametrk 
estimation techniques (such as that suggested by Ichimura, 1986) used in place of probit 
analysis. Although, this would require only minor changes of detail in what follows, this 
approach would only allow estimation of r up to scale. 
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Since direct measures of x; are unavailable, we rely on the revealed preferences of 
legislators in roll call votes to estimate Xi. The primary assumption necessary for the 
analysis is that legislators vote sincerely, i.e. if a legislator votes for one alternative over 
another, he or she actually prefers that alternative. Of course situations may arise in 
which it is in the interest of a legislator to vote "strategically" by, for example, voting 
for a "killer" amendment not because he likes it but rather because it guarantees failure 
of the unfavored bill to which the amendment is offered.10 However, for reasons explained 
below, opportunities for sophisticated voting were limited in the case we analyze. Elsewhere 
(Krehbiel and Rivers, 1985) we explicitly test for the possibility of strategic voting on the 
minimum wage votes and reject the hypothesis of sophisticated voting. 
\Ve consider the situation where two votes are taken. First, legislators vote between 
minimum wage levels 01 and 02, and 02 is victorious. Second, 02 is voted against 03. The 
values of 01, 02 and 03 can be determined from the record. In our case, 01 < 02 < 03. (In 
other situations these values could be estimated, but this will not be a concern here.) Under 
assumption of sincere voting, a legislator votes for alternative 01 over 02 in the first vote if 
u;(01) > u;(02) and otherwise votes against 01. In the second vote, legislator i votes for 02 
over 03 if Ui(02) > ui(03), and otherwise votes against 02 in the second vote. In the two 
votes there are four possible voting patterns which "reveal" the legislator's preferences as 
shown in the top of Table 1. From the assumptions about utility functions in equation (1), 
u;( Oi) > u;( Ok) if and only if </>;(IOi-xd) > </>;(IOk -xd). Since </>; is strictly decreasing, this
condition is equivalent to IOi-xd < IOk-xd which, in turn, is equivalent to x; < (Oj+Ok)/2 
if Oj:::; Ok or x; > (Oj + Ok)/2 if Oj >Ok. Thus we have the bottom of Table 1 which defines 
the intervals depicted in Figure 1 .11 
[Table 1 and Figure 1 here) 
The method for estimation of ideal points relies on revealed preferences. As Table 1 
and Figure 1 show, the voting pattern of each legislator implies that his or her ideal point 
10 See, for example, Farquharson (1969), Enelow (1981), Enelow and Koehler (1980), and
Denzau, Riker and Shepsle (1985). 11 Since we have assumed that 01 < 02 < 03, is not possible for x; < (01 + 02)/2 and 
x; � (02 + 03)/2 to hold simultaneously. That is, we should not observe any (Yes, No) votes. 
The upper right hand cell of Table lb should be empty (as it is for the pair of minimum 
wage votes analyzed in the next section). With other orderings of the bill locations, other 
cells should be empty, but unidimensionality always implies the existence of at least one 
empty cell. This suggests a simple nonparametric test for unidimensionality of roll calls. 
7 
TABLE 1 
Deriving Revealed Preferences from Votes 
No Yes 
u;(01):::; u;(02) Uj(01) > U;(02) 
No 
ui(02):::; u;(03) u;(02):::; ui(03) 
u;(01) :::; u;(02) u;(Oi) > ui(02) 
Yes 
Ui(02) > U;(03) u;(02) > u;(03) 
No Yes 
Xj � (01 + 02)/2 Xj < (01 + 02)/2 
No 
X; � (02 + 03)/2 Xi � (02 + 03)/2 
Xj � (01 + 02)/2 Xj < (01+ 02)/2 
Yes 
Xi < (02 + 03)/2 Xj < (02 + 03)/2 
Figure 1 
Ideal Points Revealed by Voting Patterns 
(Yes, Yes) (No, Yes) (No, No) 
x. 
I 
x; falls into a particular interval. Although this information is not sufficient to identify 
the precise value .of x;, there is enough information to estimate the relationship between 
the ideal point x; and the legislator's observable characteristics z;. The basic idea is that 
equation (2) is in the form of an ordered probit model. Low values of x; would imply that 
the legislator would vote "Yes" on both roll calls, while high values would imply "No" votes 
in both cases. Intermediate values of x; would imply support for the higher minimum wage 
fh proposed in the second amendment and opposition to the lower level 81 proposed in the 
first amendment. Thus, voting patterns provide a rough categorization of ideal points x; as 
"low," ((Yes,Yes) in Figure 1), "medium," (No,Yes), or "high" (No,No) and equation (2)
falls within the ordered probit framework considered by Aitchison and Silvey (1957). 
·what distinguishes the present situation from the usual probit case is that if the bill 
locations (Oj) are known (as in the minimum wage example) the parameters I can be 
estimated consistently. If the bill positions are unknown, then we are back in the customary 
position of only being able to estimate/ only up to a multiplicative scale factor. (Details
are provided in an appendix.) In both cases the relationship between ideal points and the
observable characteristics of legislators can be analyzed. When bill positions are known, 
we can estimate the actual distance (in  terms of dollars for minimum wages) between, say, 
Democratic and Republican legislators, while in the other case it wi.11 only be possible to 
say whether Democrats have higher or lower ideal points (on average) than Republicans.
The bill positions provide the metric for the estimated ideal points. 
III. Application to the Minimum Wage Amendments of 1977 
To assess committee power in an actual congressional setting, we apply the technique 
introduced above to roll call votes taken during the Senate's consideration of minimum wage 
legislation in 1977. This analysis culminates in estimation and comparison of median ideal 
points of members of the full Senate and d its Committee on Labor and Human Resources. 
The dimension on which ideal points are scaled is simply the hourly wage in dollars. The 
analysis proceeds several steps: discussion of the congressional history of the minimum 
wage issue, estimation of the determinants of voting on the minimum wage, derivation of 
Senator's ideal points, and finally, interpretation in the context of committee power. 
Congress first adopted a minimum wage of twenty-five cents per hour in the Fair Labor 
8 
Standards Act of 1938 and ha,  periodically raised the mandated levc>l as wage inflation has 
rmdered the old minimum wage ineffective, Such was the case in 1977 when a newly elected 
Democratic president, prodded by his union supporters: proposed a twenty cent per hour
increase from the existing $2.30 per hour minimum to $2.50 per hour. The increase proposed 
by President Carter fell far short of labor's expectations. Unions desired an immediate 
increase in the minimum wage to $3.00 per hour with additional increases in subsequent 
years. After protracted negotiations with union leaders and their allies in civil rights groups, 
the Carter administration revised its proposal to incorporate a $2.65 minimum (effective 
January 1978) that would be indexed to the inflation rate. In response to heavy industry 
lobbying in September, the House rejected indexing and substituted a schedule of increases: 
$2.65 in 1978, $2.85 in 1979, and $3.05 in 1980. In October the Senate, after considerable 
squabbling (discussed below), approved a four-step increase in the minimum wage: $2.65 in 
1978, $2.90 in 1979, $3.15 in 1980, and $3.40 in 1981. In conference, a compromise reduced 
the 1980 minimum to $3.10 and the 1981 minimum to $3.35 (where it remains as of this 
writing). Both chambers approved the conference report and the bill was enacted into law. 
The minimum wage amendments of 1977 are amenable to the analytic techniques 
sketched above and permit some inferences about committee power that, in the absence 
of such techniques, are not possible. The Senate minimum wage votes involved a single, 
clearly defined dimension of choice: at what level should the minimum wage be set? Esti­
mates of preferences on this dimension are easily interpreted as dollar amounts. Although, 
as will be shown, there was little possibility for strategic voting on the 1977 minimum wage 
amendments, we are able to establish with some confidence what strategies were available 
and what the likely outcomes would have been if different strategies had been adopted by 
the participants. 
Senate debate on the minimum wage bill broke no new ground. Proponents argued 
that an increase was long overdue (it had been three years since the minimum wage had 
been raised with considerable inflation in the intervening period). At $2.30 per hour, the 
minimum wage would provide an annual income of only $4,800 which would leave a family 
of four under the poverty level. By gradually raising the minimum wage, they reasoned, no 
fully employed worker would earn less than the poverty level. Opponents countered that 
raising the minimum wage does not necessarily raise anyone's wage and that the more likely 
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consequence would be to red11ce employment since employers would have incentives to lay off 
< urrent workers whose productivity could not justify a wage in excess of the new mandated 
minimum. An increased minimum wage would also, they argued, harm the employment 
prospects of those currently out of work (especially teenagers with little or no labor mark<'t 
experience). As in other years, conservatives tried proposing a lower minimum wage for 
teenagers when it became apparent that their general arguments about the ill effects of the 
minimum wage would not prevail. 
The confusing part of this argument is not its content, but rather who made it. Conser­
vatives are not known for their overwhelming concern about unemployment. Nevertheless, 
they based their arguments almost exclusively on the bill's adverse effects of low wage 
workers and the unemployed. In the case of employment effects, conservatives clearly had 
the better of the argument. In a competitive labor market, where workers are paid their 
marginal revenue product, raising the minimum wage will cause employers to layoff their 
lowest paid workers. However, und�r monopsony (e.g., when workers accumulate firm­
specific human capital that is not transferable to another employer) some workers may be 
paid less than their marginal revenue product and will manage to hold on to their jobs even 
when the minimum wage is raised above their previous wage. Liberals sometimes argue 
that employment losses from increasing the minimum wage will be small and offset by wage 
gains.12
Conservative concern over unemployment and a liberal preference for increasing the 
earnings of some workers at the cost of more unemployment for their less well paid col­
leagues appear implausible. A more likely explanation for the political alignment on the 
minimum wage issue is constituency based. The primary advocates of increasing the mini­
mum wage are labor unions whose preferences on this issue have a clear economic foundation. 
Had labor's proposed increase in 1977 been enacted, it probably would have substantially 
restricted the ability of firms to substitute low wage nonunion wnrkers for their typically 
better paid union counterparts. (Small to moderate increases, such as that finally adopted 
in 1977, a,Ppear to have minimal employment effects. Some low wage workers may increase 
their earnings, but wage inflation means that the real minimum wage stays constant or 
12 For a survey of economic opinion on the effects of minimum wages, see Brown, Gilroy,
and Kohler (1982), pp. 487-528. 
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even falls so that the constraint turns out to be non binding for most workers soon after its 
adoption.) ::'he beneficiaries of raising the minimum wage are workers earning somewhat 
more, but not substantially more, than the minimum, since their services are more easily 
substitutable for those of low wage workers. These are precisely the workers most likely to 
be unionized. 
Minimum wage increases are often supported by northern Republicans, perhaps because 
the degree of unionization in their states forces them to compete for union votes. Apart from 
unionization, northern states also tend to have higher wage levels than southern or western 
states. Raising the minimum wage only raises wage rates in areas where the prevailing wage 
is near the minimum. B y  narrowing the gap in labor costs between northern and southern 
manufacturers, minimum wage increases can benefit northern states without having any 
direct effect upon their internal labor markets. 
This brief discussion has identified several factors that might lead legislators to favor 
or oppose an increase in the minimum wage. First, the standard economic analysis, which 
focuses on the employment effects of the minimum wage, would suggest that legislators rep­
resenting areas with high unemployment would oppose raising the minimum wage. Second, 
a higher minimum wage makes firms in high wage areas more competitive with firms with 
lower labor costs and should be supported by congressmen from high wage states. Third, 
raising the minimum wage improves the bargaining position of unions and, therefore, should 
be supported by legislators from more unionized areas and by Democrats who rely more 
heavily than Republicans upon union support. Democrats may also favor the minimum 
wage for ideological reasons since it was one of the progressive reforms successfully enacted 
during the New Deal. 
We use the model described in the previous section to analyze three Senate votes on 
the Fair Labor Standard Amendments of 1977 (S. 1871). The Labor and Human Resources 
Committee originally reported a bill containing indexing of the minimum wage. The index­
ing provision had been opposed in committee by Republicans, but an effort to eliminate 
indexing had been defeated in a party-line vote. Sometime between the time the committee 
reported the bill and when it was introduced on the floor, the committee chairman, Harrison 
A. 'Williams, reached an agreement with the ranking minority member, Jacob K. Javits, 
that they would sponsor an amendment replacing indexing by a specified four step increase 
1 1  
in  the minimum wage. Given then current inflation forecasts, the Williams substitute would 
have accomplished wlnt indexing was intended to do: raise the minimum wage to $2.65 
per hour in 1978, $2.90 in 1979, $3.15 in 1980, and $3.40 in 1981. (In retrospect, inflation 
far exceeded 1977 expectations, so that indexing would have had rather different results. 
However, even critics of indexing, such as Senator John Tower who described the 'Williams 
amendment as "back-door indexing" that would "eliminate the formula, but keep the re­
sults,'' did not foresee the inflationary spiral of the late seventies.) It is doubtful that a bill 
incorporating indexing could have passed. Senate moderates were strongly opposed to in­
dexing and the House had already defeated an indexing provision. Indexing was effectively 
dead, so the practical alternatives were no minimum wage bill or one with a sequence of 
prespecified minimum wage increases. Williams undoubtedly would have preferred indexing 
of the minimum wage, but he compromised on the point without pressing the committee's 
point on the floor. 
A unanimous consent agreement was reached that allowed debate on two additional 
amendments (see Congressional Record, October 7, 1977, p. 32697). We refer to these 
according to their authors, Bartlett and Tower. The first amendment, offered by Repub­
lican Dewey B artlett, would have raised the hourly minimum wage by only twenty cents 
per year resulting in a $2.90 minimum by 1980. The Bartlett amendment was soundly 
defeated in a 72-17 vote. Subsequently Tower proposed the same sequence of increases the 
House had passed (resulting in a $3.05 minimum wage in 1980). This compromise was 
also rejected, though the margin of defeat was narrower (60-32). After one additional vote 
(on an unprinted amendment), the Senate then approved the Williams amendment by an 
overwhelming margin of 76-14. 
The two key votes that are used to estimate ideal points were those on the Bartlett and 
Tower amendments. Both amendments were offered in the hope of finding a compromise 
minimum wage level below that agreed upon by committee members Williams and Javits. 
As described in the preceding section, the most preferred minimum wage level for each 
legislator is taken to be a function of some observable characteristics of the legislator and of 
his or her constituency. For this analysis, legislator characteristics consist of the Senator's 
party (Democrats = 1, Republicans = 0) and region (southerners 
= 
1, others = 0). The 
following constituency variables were used: average manufacturing hourly wage in each 
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state, percent of labor force belonging to labor unions, and percent nonwhite of population. 
Table 2 presents estimates for di iferent models of preferences over minimum wage levels. 
The implicit "dependent variable" for each equation is the Senator's ideal point on most 
desired minimum wage level. A predicted ideal point can be computed for each Senator 
by multiplying each coefficient by the value of the corresponding variable for the Senator 
in question and summing. The parameter a is the estimated standard deviation of ideal 
points around their predicted values. On the whole, the equations appear to fit reasonably 
well. A 95% confidence interval around the predicted ideal points brackets points only $0.20 
higher or lower than the predicted ideal point, while over 70% of the three possible voting 
patterns are correctly predicted ex post. 
[Table 2 here] 
The first equation in Table 2 relies primarily on economic variables as determinants of 
Senatorial preferences. Overall, the estimated effects of the economic variables are quite 
small. A ten percent inqease in the percent of labor force belonging to unions increases 
the desired minimum wage level by a little more than $0.04, while a $1.00 increase in 
average manufacturing wage increases the desired minimum wage by only $0.03. Neither c:if 
these effects is very precisely estimated. The estimated unemployment effect is statistically 
significant but so small as to be of no consequence. 
The second equation substitutes region and percent black for the wage and employment 
variables. The "political" variables appear to be better predictors of Senatorial preferences, 
as indicated by the increase in the log likelihood. Southern Senators are esth�ated to favor
a minimum wage $0.10  lower than non-southerners. The estimated effect of representing 
more blacks is positive, but insignificant. Also note that the estimated union effect is almost 
twice as large in this equation as the previous one. 
The third equation combines both sets of variables. Given the small sample size, it 
is difficult to obtain precise estimates, but the union and region effects hold up. The 
estimated unemployment coefficient is much larger (a one percent increase in unemployment 
is estimated to increase the desired wage by about $0.01) but still insignificant. The other 
coefficients (except for party) are small and insignificant.
In all three equations, a substantial pa.rty effect is present with Democratic Senators 
preferring a minimum wage of $0.17, to $0.22 higher than Republicans. Overall, there 
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Constant 
Party 
Union x 100 
·wage
Unemployment x 100 
South 
Black 
(1 
log L 
Percent 
correctly predicted 
TABLE 2 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
(1) (2) (3) 
2.705 2.921 2.816 
(0.412) (0.061) (0.145) 
0.169 0.219 0.221 
(0.036) (0.047) (0.005) 
0.438 0.815 0.601 
(0.324) (0.280) (0.335) 
0.029 0.016 
(0.026) (0.027) 
0.020 1.134 
(0.012) ( 1.244) 
-0.102 -0.107 
(0.061) (0.061) 
0.002 -0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) 
0.105 0.098 0.097 
-54.3 -49.7 -49.1 
73.9 75.0 76.1 
app<'ars to be little evidence than preferences over minimum wages are particularly sensitive' 
to wage and employment considerations suggested by traditional microeconomic analyses. 
'�'e do, however, find substantial party, regional and unionization effects. 
"'hat, then, can be inferred about committee power on the Senate's minimum wage 
decision? The strategic situation for the committee was typical for the Senate. Committee 
members expected amendments to be offered on the floor. The unanimous consent agree­
ment, negotiated informally by committee and Senate leaders prior to consideration of the 
bill, confirmed the committee's procedural expectations. The strategic situation on the floor 
was defined by information contained in the UCA and bill managers' statements regard­
ing the sequence of proposals on which votes would be taken.13 Three empirical questions 
emerge from this setting and reveal necessary conditions for committee power. 
1. Did committee and parent chamber preferences diverge (as reflected by their respective
median voters)?
2. Did the committee anticipate favored treatment of its bill and hence report a bill
coincident with its, rather than the parent chamber's, median position?
3. Did the parent chamber permit the exercise of committee power by either refusing to
offer anti-committee amendments or by rejecting them?
An estimated ideal point ii:; = z1')· was generated for each legislator using equation
(2) and each set of estimates reported in Table 2. The median position in the Senate and 
in the Committee on Labor and Human Resources was estimated using the median of the 
estimated ideal points for each group.14 
Table 3 presents the results and shows that of the three necessary conditions for commit­
tee power, only the first is satisfied. Estimated committee and parent chamber median ideal 
points differed by 10 to 17 cents. In spite of the strategic opportunities posed by committee­
floor differences, and contrary to the second condition, the committee's proposed bill of a 
$3.15 per hour minimum wage (in 1980) actually undershot the chamber median according 
to all three sets of estimates. Finally, in light of these estimates, the amendment activity 
13 This common knowledge of the agenda poses the possibility of sophisticated voting on 
the floor. However, as noted above, elsewhere we test and reject the sophisticated voting 
hypothesis on these votes (Krehbiel and Rivers, 1 985). 
14 Krehbiel and Rivers (1985, Appendix B) show that this procedure produces consistent 
estimates of the group medians. 
14  
on the floor refutes even more strongly the committee power hypothesis. The offering of 
anti-committee amendments suggests the absence of deference or committee power. More 
subtly, the failure of the parent chamber to pass these amendments cannot be interpreted 
as unambiguous support for the committee, because the committee had already converged 
to the approximate floor median. 
[Table 3 here] 
IV. Multidimensional Bills
The model described in Section II assumes that bills can be located in a unidimensional 
space. In this section, we demonstrate how the same approach can be adapted to two or 
higher dimensional bills. The appropriate estimation procedure turns out to be multivariate 
probit analysis (Ashford and Sowden, 1970), though some special issues arise in this model. 
'Ve consider a sequence of bills 01, ... , Om which are voted in some prescribed order. In 
the first vote 01 is paired against an alternative 01, in the second vote 02 , is paired against 02
and so. In general, Oj will be determined by the form of the agenda tree and the outcomes 
of prior votes. Instead of the bills being representable as points on a line, the bills will be 
pointu in p-dimensional Euclidean space: 
Oi = (O},. .. ,Oj)' 
Initially, we will assume that the bill positions are known, though later we indicate how 
it is possible to discard this assumption. Each legislator possesses an ideal point Xi E RP 
representing his or her most preferred alternative: 
Xi= (xL ... , xf)' 
Legislators prefer outcomes "closer" to their ideal points. Assuming again that legislators 
vote sincerely, legislator i will vote for bill 0 j over the alternative Oj if Oj is closer to his or 
her ideal point x; than Oi, that is: 
(3) 
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Chamber 
Committee 
Difference 
TABLE 3 
Estimates of Committee and Parent Chamber Medians* 
(1) 
$3.18 
$3.28 
$0.10 
(2) 
$3.16 
$3.33 
$0.17 
(3) 
$3.17 
$3.34 
$0.17 
*Proposals: committee's bill, $3.15; Bartlett amendment, $2.90; Tower amendment, $3.05.
where II · II denotes the usual Euclidean norm: II x II = Vx'X.15 Figure 2 illustrates how
the condition (3) partitions a two-dimensional policy space into voting regions. 
[Figure 2 here] 
Condition (3) is a somewhat stronger restriction on preferences than the symmetric 
utility assumption used in Section II. Specifically (3) requires that legislators have circular 
indifference contours in the p-dimensional policy space (also known as "Type I preferences").
Thus, dimensions are separable and weighted equally. Alternatively, legislators could use a 
"weighted distance" in evaluating different bills as in Davis and Hinich (1966). This adds 
an extra set of parameters to the problem. If the bill positions are known, the weights 
can be estimated subject to a normalization. If bill positions are unknown and need to be 
estimated, however, the weights will not be identified. To simplify the exposition, we focus 
on the case of Type I preferences. 
The goal of estimation is to relate legislators' ideal points Xii which are unobservable, 
to a set of observable legislator characteristics Zi. The analog of equation (2) in the multi­
dimensional case will be a set of regression-type equations, one for each dimension in the 
policy space: 
x{ = 1}z; + E{ (i = 1, ... ,n; j = 1, . . . ,p) ( 4) 
Of course, different explanatory variables can be used in the equations for ideal points 
in different dimensions by restricting elements of ')'j to be zero, but there is no point in 
complicating the notation to indicate this possibility. The errors f; = (El , ... , Ef)' are assumed
to have a multivariate normal distribution with zero mean vector and positive definite 
covariance matrix�. independent of z;. 
Initially consider the conditions on ideal points implied by the possible voting patterns 
in the first two roll calls. Table 3 shows the implied restrictions on ideal points. Substituting 
equation ( 4) into the expressions in the upper left hand cell of Table 3 gives the following 
conditions for voting "Yes" on both roll calls: 
(5) 
15 The condition in (3) is equivalent to assuming that legislator i's utility function takes
the form u;(Oj) = 1/>;(ll x; - Oj II), where</>; is any strictly decreasing function. '.fhus, (3)
reduces to equation (1) in the unidimensional casP. 
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(6) 
where r = ( '')'J, ... , '')'p)· (Similar expressions can be derived for the other possible rnting
patterns.) Let A = (01 -81 ,02 -82 )' and Oj =}(II 8j 112 - II Oj 112). The joint probability of 
conditions (5) and (6) holding simultaneously (conditional on z;) is given by the bivariate 
normal orthant probability: 
Prob(Yes,Yes) = <1>(61 -(01 - Oi)'I'1z;,82 - (02 -_02)1r1z;;A1I'1EI'A) (7) 
where: 
<I>(h,k;Q) = (27r)-1 lf11-1/2 J_�J_� exp{-�(u,v)W1(u,v)'}dvdu
The probability in (7) is in the form of a bivariate probit model with cross-equation restric­
tions. At present little software is available for this type of estimation, but the problem is 
well within the bounds of current numerical computational capabilities. 
It is apparent from equation (7) that with only two votes, it will be possible to estimate 
ideal points on at most two dimensions. If the columns of A are dependent, even this will 
not be possible as A1I'1EI' A will be singular and the dimensionality of the probability in 
(7) can be reduced. The critical issue is the degree to which the voting directions O; - 01 
span the policy space. In the general m-vote case, where A = (01 - 81, ... , Om -Om) has full 
column rank, it will be possible to estimate ideal points in up tom dimensions. 
The expressions for the voting probabilities in the general case require a little more 
notation. Let d;; be a dummy variable taking the value +1 if legislator i votes for 8; over 
O; and the value - 1  if legislator i votes for O; over O;. The condition for a "Yes" vote on 
the jth roll call is: 
while the condition for a "1fo" vote is: 
Combining (8) and (9) gives the condition implied by the voting behavior d;;: 
" 1 . 2 2 • I I  d;jE;(8j - o1)::; 2rn 8; II - II 01 II ) - dij(o1 - o1) r z;
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(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
Figure 2 
Location of Ideal Points in Two Dimensions 
by Voting Patterns 
(No, Yes) 
/<------- • -
/v'-------"" 
/A.\------8 = 1 -
·--­'1-------,...., --�---
82-:::::::::. 
L<'t Di be a diagonal matrix with dij as its jth diagonal element and b = (b1, .. . ,bm)· From 
(10) we obtain the probability for a particular voting pa.tt.ern (di1, ... , dim):
Prob(ch1, ... , dim) = if'p(b - DiA'f'zi;DiA'f'I::r ADi) (11) 
where if'p(t; n) is the cumulative distribution function of a p-varia.te normal random variable 
with mean zero and covariance matrix n evaluated at the point t E RP. 
If the bill positions Oj are unknown, then equation (11) can be estimated as an un­
constrained multiYariate probit model. A set of coefficients of Zi will be estimated for each 
category of the dependent variable (i.e., for each voting pattern). Each coefficient vector 
(apart from the category-specific constant) will correspond to a column of r A. Thus, we are
confronted with a rotational problem similar to that encountered in factor analysis: unless 
there are a priol'i restrictions on the elements of r, the bill positions (in the matrix A) will 
be arbitrary. 
The discussion in this section indicates a strategy for the estimation of legislative voting 
models in the case of multidimensional roll calls that generalizes the approach developed 
in Section II and applied to the minimum wage votes in Section III. As the dimensionality 
of the policy space increases, the computational requirements grow very quickly. But for 
a low-dimensional policy space (say two or three dimensions) the techniques proposed here 
should be feasible. 
V. Discussion 
The three primary objectives of this paper were to accentuate the need for measures 
of legislators' preferences, to discuss econometric techniques for deriving such estimates, 
and to apply the technique to a congressional situation that permits substantive inferences 
a bout committee power. This discussion treats these points in reverse order. 
First, the substantive inferences about committee power during Senate consideration 
of minimum wage legislation are clear. The Committee on Labor and Human Resources 
was not powerful, and its bill received little if any deferential treatment on the Senate 
floor. Contrary to the sort of inferences that would be drawn from the committee's success 
in defeating hostile amendments, we find no evidence of committee power. In fact, the 
situation appears to have been exactly the opposite: the committee tailored its legislation 
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to fit the preferences of the median voter in the chamber. Although the main purpose 
for analyzing these votes was to demonstrate the technique rather than to test tl1eories 
of commit.tee power, the empirical results do have implications for the three classes of 
explanations discussed in Section II. 
The Committee's informational advantage over the parent chamber seems to ha Ye been 
minimal. Minimum wage legislation had received congressional consideration on several 
prior occasions; numerous studies of the effects of minimum wage have been in the public 
domain for years and were cited during Senate debate; and Senators seemed to have clea.rly 
formed beliefs about the likely consequences of the policy alternatives on their constituents. 
Thus, even though the several members of the Committee could rightly be regarded as pol­
icy experts in some fields of labor and human resources, the minimum wage issue afforded 
no member "special expertise" or "private information" that would yield a prediction of 
committee power on this issue. In sum, this analysis offers only indirect support of infor­
mational explanations of committee power. Committee power did not exist where a pure 
expertise-based account. says it should not exist. More convincing support requires analysis 
of situations in which the committee possesses private information. 
The case is also not an ideal one for testing most institutional accounts of committee 
power because the Senate characteristically permits more open consideration of its commit­
tees' bills than the House. In unidimensional situations (such as the level of minimum wage 
provision), two-stage committee-floor models predict median outcomes, and the Senate's 
choice is consistent with this prediction of the model. For equation (3), the estimated floor 
median was $3.17 and the bill was $3.15. However, except under special cases,16 institution­
based spatial models make no predictions about committee behavior under the expectation 
of an open rule. So the results are weakly supportive. The committee had little procedu­
ral protection, defensively reported a bill near the floor median, and, consistent with the 
model, avoided taking a beating on the floor. But a3ain, more convincing support requires 
comparative analysis of cases in which more restrictive treatment is given to committee's 
bills. The House is a natural place to turn.17 
16 See Krehbiel (1985).
17 Of course, the analysis cannot be of the form: Are committees that receive restricth•e 
rules more "powerful" than committees that receive open rule? One must keep in mind 
that choice of rules is endogenous. 
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The indirect, qualified support for informational and institutional explanations for com­
mittee power is contrasted by the strong evidence the minimum wage case provides against 
behavioral accounts of committee power. If pro-committee norms were dominant in the Sen­
ate, two things would have been observed: opportunistic behavior by the committee (e.g., 
reporting a bill that corresponded to its median-not the parent chamber's), and deferential 
behavior by Senators on the floor (either no amendments, or support of the committee if 
amendments were offered). Neither of these was observed, and doubt is thereby cast on 
the simple, norms-based account of committee power. Of course, all of these inferences are 
tentative, given the narrow scope of the paper and confinement to one set of votes. Nev­
ertheless, they illustrate the potential of the technique for addressing questions of central 
concern to students of legislative behavior. 
Second, we have illustrated that econometric techniques can provide useful estimates of 
legislators' preferences. Although we have indicated how our approach can be generalized 
to handle multidimensional policy spa,ces and unknown bill locations, it should be clear that 
the analysis cannot be mechanically repeated on hundreds of other roll calls. Considerable 
information about the nature of the choices facing legislators and how legislator preferences 
are related to their observable characteristics are required. While our approach lacks the 
generality of some scaling methods, it also avoids many of their indeterminancies. One ends 
up with fairly precise estimates of preferences that allow direct evaluation of how legislative 
outcomes corresponded to the preferences of the key players. 
Finally, the paper began with an argument that adequate tests of theories about com­
mittee power often require estimates of legislators' ideal points. However, the correspond­
ingly narrow substantive focus and application to the stud;y of committee power understates 
the utility of the technique for attaining a better understanding of legislative politics. In­
variably (albeit sometimes inexplicitly), theories of legislative politics are based at least in 
part upon legislator's preferences, be they induced via the electoral connection, dictated 
by powerful lobbyists, or purely ideology-based. Thus, any theory that yields predictions 
about the relationship between legislators' preferences and legislative choices stands to ben­
efit from further development and application of techniques discussed here. 
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Appendix 
In the main body of the paper, it was shown that legislator i will choose one of the
following vote combinations depending on the value of his ideal point x;: 
where: 
(Yes, Yes) 
(No,Yes) 
(No,No) 
if 
if 
if 
x; < (01 + Oa)/2
(01 + Oa)/2:::; x; < (02 + Oa)/2
x; 2'. (02 + Oa)/2
X; = zh+f; 
and f; = x; - E(x;lz;). We will assume, in addition, that f; is normally independently
distributed with mean zero and variance u2 > 0 and that the first component of z; is 
identically equal to one. Let 
and: 
Then we have: 
Yi= [x; - (01 + Ba)/2)/u,
µ=(Ba - B1)/2u, 
/31 = [11 - (01 + Ba)/2)/u,
/3j = /j/U (j 2'. 2) 
0 if 
y; = { 
2
1 if 
if 
voted (Yes,Yes) 
voted (No,Yes) 
i voted (N o,N o) 
y; = { � :: 
2 if 
Yi> 0 
0 :::; Yi<µ
Yi 2'. µ 
and the problem has been cast in the form of an ordered probit model (see Dubin and 
Rivers, 1986, pp. 78-80). Conditional on z;, the distribution of x; is shown in Figure 3.
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f (x/z ) 
F i g u re 3 
Conditional Distribution of I deal Poi nts 
x 
,Y'Z 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ·
.
: · · · · · · · · · · · ( 82+ 83 )12 
:::: Prob (No , Yes ) 
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · : ... ?: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ( e 1+ 82 )12 
Prob ( Yes ,  Yes )
B�· integrating the conditional distribu tion over the relevant regions, we can obtin the 
probability of each vot ng pattern for each legislator. 
[Figure 3 here] 
Maximum likelihood estimates of f3 and µ, denoted fl and fl.. respectively, can be 
obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood: 
Ln (/3, µ) = L log iI>(z:/3) + L log [iI>(µ - z:/3) - il>(z:/3)] + L log il>(z:/3 - µ) 
y1 =0 y,=1 Y1 ::::2 
These estimates are consistent and asymptotically normally distributed with asymptotic 
covariance matrix R(/3, µ)-1 , where R(/3, µ) denotes Fisher's information matrix: 
R(/3, µ) = (Rilil RiJµ ) R"3µ Rµµ 
R = -E (82Ln (/3, p)) /J/J 8/38/3' 
R = -E (82Ln(/3, µ)) iJµ 8/38µ 
R = -E (82Ln(f3, µ)) µµ 8µ2 
Differentiation of L n  is straightforward, though expressions for the Hessian may also be 
found in textbooks (e.g., Madalla, 1983, pp. 48-49). In the above expressions, z; can be . 
taken as random (in which case, the expectation is taken with respect to the joint (y; , z;) 
distribution) or as a non-random square summable sequence. 
Once consistent estimates fl and &2 of f3 and u2 have been obtained, it is straightforward 
to obtain estimates of E(x; lz;) for each legislator: 
a =  (Oa 
-
01 )/2µ 
22 
l\ote that x; is a consistent estimator of E( x; lz;) . We may be interested in estimat ing order 
statistics such as the median of x; for some set of legislators. It is easy to show that the 
median of x; for the group is a consistent estimator as the size of the group increases. This 
means that if the group size is large, we are justified in using the median of the estimated 
ideal points as an estimator of the median position in the group. (See Krehbiel and Rivers, 
1985 for details.) 
Computation of standard errors for the pa.rameter estimates is accomplished using the 
multivariate fi method (Bishop, Fienberg, and Holland, 1975, pp. 492-494). First, note 
that: 
0/ 
o/3' = al 
81 _ Ba - 01 /3 _ a /3 8µ - - "'2;Jl - µ 
It follows that the asymptotic variance of i' is given by: 
. or · 81.1 or · . Dr' V( r) = a/3' V(/3) 8/3 + 8/3' C(/3, µ) 8µ 
+ 81 C( .t, fl) 8r' + V( " ) 81 81' 8µ I 8/3 JI 8µ 8µ 
2 2 = u2 V(fl) - '!_C(/J, fl.)/31 - '!_/3C(/J, fl.) µ µ 
2 + ()' 2 v (fl.)/3/3' µ 
Finally, using the partitioned inverse formula and substituting, we obtain: 
V( i') = a2 [RµµM + !_(AI RiJµ/3' + /3R"3µM) + ( I + R:µM R/lµ ) /3/3'] µ µ Rµi• 
where M = (R!l/l - R/lµR"3µ )-1 • Note that RµµM is the asymptotic covariance matrix of 
fl. 
When the bill positions 01 , 02 , and Oa are unknown the above calculations will no longer 
be feasible. However, except for its first component (the coefficient of a constant term), I 
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is proportional to /J. Thus, even when bill locations are unknown, it will still be possibl<' to 
analyze the relationship between legislator ideal points a!'<' their characteristics, 
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